Saugat's Political Philosophy Blog

     Philosophers and various intellectuals have used the term “the other” in various ways. It seems that most of the time they have some entity distinct from “the self” in mind when they think of something as “the other.” For some, there is a ‘racial other,’ for others there is a ‘sexual other,' both of which are usually other persons, other selves. I use “the other” here in a different, more philosophical way such that those previous usages will come to be seen as denoting what can be called ‘anothers.’      For me, the other is not the distinct entity from the self. To put it generally, ‘that’ is not an other to ‘this.’ Rather, ‘that' is 'another,' if it is to be considered distinct. What I am proposing is a thorough re-thinking of the way we envision inter-entity dynamics, so that we have self, other and an other, and not just self and other. But more importantly, I am proposing that we use the term 'the other' to denote something more proximate to the self

In a world where a state were allowed to do so, state power would not only concern itself with the street corners to install a surveillance camera. In such a world, the network of surveillance cameras would be not only horizontal, with a street-by-street installation, but also vertical: any act of transgressively removing the street-corner camera is recorded, but any act of transgressively shutting down the screens in which the street’s footage is monitored is also recorded, and if one goes ‘further up’ to remove that camera, another one is recording still, presenting it to yet another screen, which is also being recorded, and so on. Now, although the following might not yet be empirically true, let us assume that each camera in the vertical chain is powered by its own energy source, like a battery, and is therefore not connected to an infrastructure which has a switch where every camera can be shut off all at once.  The question then is, is this vertical system of surveillance

There seem to be two main types of political activity possible today. First, there is activity concerned with the disclosure of the meaning of signs. This is the usual political project, wherein an endeavor is exhausted when a sign is thought to be fully understood. For example, a political project that seeks to know the meaning of an abstraction, like the concept ‘capitalism,’ operates in this manner. But the second type of activity is more interesting and perhaps more relevant. In this activity, it is not so much the meaning of a sign that is disclosed, as much as a sign’s existence that is disclosed. All the political power sees is that the sign is hidden, but that sign has no significance from a meaningfulness point of view [refer to examples below]. Instead, that hiddenness is the full motivating factor behind the venture towards the sign’s disclosure. The political project operates here like a game, and only goes so far as to uncover the sign, to bring it into a field of v

Political action is often taken to realize some sort of ultimately ideal social reality. We have values such as universal freedom and universal justice, which pertain to future social realities that have these ideas realized within them. But what is the true nature of society? What, fundamentally, is a society? Might this be the main question for a political project that is not as influenced by values? Let us assume that the truest version of a society is a just or free society. We might think this is what a society truly ought to be like, and that unjust and unfree societies are not just bad from a value-based perspective, but also imperfect from an objective standpoint. Now, it is up to us in our political projects to go towards this society. For this move towards it, a single project is possible, but within that project the following two points are in order:  First, if a completely just or free society is the true nature of society, then it has to be eternally just and fre

We hear politicians refer to a “community” of people at times. These references might be in the form of “the public” or, more problematically, “a group of individuals.” The problem is that it is insufficiently clear what is meant by a community or an individual. Of course, a community is thought to be a group of individuals. But what is an individual? Is our concept of an individual to be based on the concept of a soul? This certainly has spiritual and philosophical connotations [especially Plato, in some ways]. It suggests a degree or part of the individual is immaterial. If the individual is or contains immateriality, then, it seems, it has an equal chance to lend itself to two facets of human activity: namely, activity on individual desire/volition or activity in the social world [political activity]. The individual which is or has a soul has the true choice of either an action on its desires [eg, pursuing its sexual or professional interests] or an action in the wider s

In life, one ought to choose a framework of action that allows one to revel in the victories therein and also genuinely feel the sting of losses. One ought not to choose a framework of action where one transcends the losses and victories, where all narrative tracks and events are rendered meaningless. This applies also to politics, where people transcend their political duties, roles and actions all too often, and moreover do not feel accountable when they win or lose, despite the wider consequences to society of that.  Now what causes the meaningless transcendence I am thinking of here? The cause is not a particularly intense victory or a particularly stinging defeat. These only compel actors to act even better, even stronger and in even more effective ways towards bringing about future victories. What causes meaningless transcendence is the understanding or foresight of the rules of the game. When this happens, one transcends something that seemed as meaningful as even one’s m